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"Scarcely any question arises in the United States which does
not become, sooner or later, a subject of judicial debate. . . ."
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America
I. INTRODUCTION
Christians, Muslims, and Jews comprise about fifty-four
percent of the world's population.2 Each religion has a common
root in Abraham,3 and each religion regards Jerusalem as a holy
site.4 Jerusalem is a city of Jewish, Muslim, and Christian
* Calvin R. Massey is a Professor of Law at the University of California
Hastings College of the Law, where he teaches courses in Constitutional Law
and Property Law.
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284 (Phillips Bradley
ed., Henry Reeve trans., A.A. Knopf 1945) (1835).
2. See Major Religions of the World Ranked by Number of Adherents,
ADHERENTS.COM, http://www.adherents.com/ReligionsByAdherents.html (last
modified Aug. 9, 2007).
3. According to the Bible, Abraham was a descendant of Noah and
through his son, Isaac, the ancestor of Moses and Jesus. OMID SAFI, MEMORIES
OF MUHAMMAD: WHY THE PROPHET MATTERS 88 (2009). According to the Koran,
Abraham's son Ishmael is the ancestor of Muhammad. PHYLLIS G. JESTICE,
HOLY PEOPLE OF THE WORLD: A CROSS-CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 411 (2004).
4. Jerusalem has always been regarded by Jews as the spiritual capital of
Judaism and was the site of the Temple. Jewish attachment to Jerusalem is
captured by Psalm 137:6: "May my tongue cling to the roof of my mouth ... if I
do not consider Jerusalem my highest joy." Psalms 137:6 (New International
87
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residents,5 but is politically controlled by Israel, claimed in part
by Jordan and the nascent state of Palestine, and treated by the
United Nations as an international city. Given the diplomatic
and geopolitical implications of the conflict between Israel and
Palestine and the passion that conflict arouses in Americans of
all political and religious affiliations, it is no surprise that
American courts should be asked to decide the status of
Jerusalem, at least as far as the United States may be concerned.
M.B.Z. v. Clinton is the vehicle by which the Supreme Court
must decide which branch of the federal government has the
responsibility and authority to do so. 6
Ever since the modern state of Israel was created, American
official policy has been "to take no side in the contentious debate
over whether Jerusalem is part of Israel."7 To that end, the
United States Department of State has maintained a policy of
noting "Jerusalem" as the place of birth of a United States citizen
born in Jerusalem.8 Usually, American citizens would have the
country of birth noted on their passport;9 thus, an American born
in Beirut would have "Lebanon" noted as the place of birth and
an American born in Haifa would have "Israel" noted as the place
of birth.
Congress sought to disturb this arrangement when it passed
Version). Islam holds that Muhammad was miraculously moved from Mecca to
Jerusalem, where he ascended into heaven from the site of the Al-Aksa mosque.
ROLAND E. MILLER, MUSLIMS AND THE GOSPEL: BRIDGING THE GAP 89 (2005). To
Christians, Jerusalem is the site of some of Jesus's ministry, his crucifixion, and
resurrection. LESTER RUTH, WALKING WHERE JESUS WALKED: WORSHIP IN
FOURTH-CENTURY JERUSALEM 4 (2010).
5. The population of Jerusalem, a city of about 840,000 people, is
approximately sixty-nine percent Jewish, twenty-nine percent Muslim,
and two percent Christian. See Population Statistics, PROCON.ORG, http://
israelipalestinian.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=000636#chart2
(last updated Sept. 17, 2010).
6. 571 F.3d 1227, cert. granted, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (May 2,
2011) (No. 10-699).
7. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State (Zivotofsky IV), 571 F.3d 1227, 1228 (D.C.
Cir. 2009), reh'g denied, 610 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. granted sub
nom. M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (May 2,
2011) (No. 10-699).
8. Id.
9. Id.
88
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the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, Fiscal Year 2003.10
Section 214 of the Act contains three provisions-only one of
which is at issue in M.B.Z.11 Section 214(a) is a hortatory
admonition to the President to move the American embassy in
Israel to Jerusalem.12 Section 214(b) forbids appropriated funds
to be used to operate any "diplomatic facility" of the United
States in Jerusalem unless it is "under the supervision of the
United States Ambassador to Israel."13 Section 214(c) bars the
use of appropriated funds to publish "any official government
document which lists countries and their capital cities unless the
publication identifies Jerusalem as the capital of Israel."14 Those
provisions lurk in the background, but only § 214(d) is at issue in
M.B.Z.:
Record of Place of Birth as Israel for Passport Purposes.-For
purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality,
or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the
city of Jerusalem, the Secretary [of State] shall, upon the
request of the citizen or the citizen's legal guardian, record the
place of birth as Israel. 15
When President George W. Bush signed the Act into law, he
insisted that American policy regarding Jerusalem has not
changed and backed that statement by his declaration that § 214
was entirely advisory, because a mandate to the President to act
in the manner prescribed by § 214 would "impermissibly
interfere with the President's constitutional authority to
formulate the position of the United States, speak for the Nation
in international affairs, and determine the terms on which
recognition is given to foreign states."16
10. See Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat. 1350 (2002).
11. See id. § 214.
12. See id. § 214(a).
13. See id. § 214(b).
14. See id. § 214(c).
15. See id. § 214(d).
16. Zivotofsky IV, 571 F.3d 1227, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Presidential Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Year 2003, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1659 (Sept. 30, 2002)), reh'g
denied, 610 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. M.B.Z. ex
rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 563 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (May 2, 2011) (No. 10-
699). The effect of a presidential signing statement asserting the invalidity of a
89
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Later in 2002, Menachem Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem
to parents who are American citizens.'1 Under United States
law, young Zivotofsky is automatically an American citizen.18
Although Menachem's mother requested a passport for her son
listing Israel as the place of birth, the State Department refused
to do so and issued a passport listing Jerusalem as the place of
birth.19 The parents then brought suit in federal court, seeking
an injunction to require the State Department to comply with
§214(d).20 The district court dismissed the complaint for want of
standing and because it raised a non-justiciable political
question.21 The D.C. Circuit reversed on the standing point and
remanded for a determination of whether § 214(d) is mandatory
or advisory and to evaluate the implications of the plaintiffs'
claim.22 On remand, the district court dismissed the complaint
for want of a justiciable issue, 23 and the D.C. Circuit affirmed
portion of the bill signed into law was not addressed in the court of appeals, was
not a part of the questions presented to the Supreme Court, or an issue on
which the Court desired to be briefed.
17. Zivotofsky IV, 571 F.3d at 1229.
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c) (2006).
19. Zivoto/sky IV, 571 F.3d at 1229.
20. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State (Zivotofsky 1), Civ. Nos.
03-1921, 03-2048, 2004 WL 5835212, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004), rev'd in part,
444 F.3d 614, 619-20 (D.C. Cir. 2006), juris. noted, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C.
2007), aff'd, 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reh'g denied, 610 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 563
U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (May 2, 2011) (No. 10-699).
21. Id. The specific grounds for the district court's conclusion that the
claim was a non-justiciable political question was that the Constitution contains
a "textually demonstrable . . . commitment" of resolution of the issue to the
President. Id. at *4. (citation omitted). Because the President enjoys the
exclusive authority to recognize foreign governments, a legislative mandate
that Jerusalem is part of Israel would "unlawfully trench upon [that] exclusive
power." Zivotofsky IV, 571 F.3d at 1229-30.
22. Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Sec'y of State (Zivotofsky II), 444 F.3d 614,
619-20 (D.C. Cir. 2006), juris. noted, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2007), aff'd,
571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reh'g denied, 610 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en
banc), cert. granted sub nom. M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 563 U.S.
131 S. Ct. 2897 (May 2, 2011) (No. 10-699).
23. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State (Zivotofsky Il), 511 F.
Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2007), aff'd 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009), reh'g denied,
610 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en bane), cert. granted sub nom. M.B.Z. ex rel.
Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (May 2, 2011) (No. 10-699).
90
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that ruling on appeal.24 Judge Harry Edwards concurred in the
judgment on the grounds that although the issue was justiciable,
Congress has no constitutional authority to direct the President
to recognize Jerusalem as part of Israel.25 A petition for
rehearing en banc was denied.26 Judge Edwards appended a
statement in which he again expressed his view that the issue is
justiciable.27 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, directing
the parties to address both the question presented and also
"[w]hether section 214 of the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal Year 2003, impermissibly infringes the President's
power to recognize foreign sovereigns."28
II. MAY THE COURT DECIDE?
Some years ago, Louis Henkin asked whether there really
was a political question doctrine.29 He thought the doctrine was
chimerical: the cases in which the Court supposedly created the
political question doctrine actually involved only "the Court
refus[ing] to invalidate the challenged actions because they were
within the constitutional authority of President or Congress."30
In other words, a ruling that an issue was a non-justiciable
political question was actually a determination on the merits
that the challenged action was valid.31 Despite Professor
Henkin's opinion, the Court says it has a political question
doctrine, and thousands of law students have absorbed the six
criteria that the Court articulated in Baker v. Carr.32 It is well
24. Zivoto/sky IV, 571 F.3d at 1227.
25. Id. at 1233-45 (Edwards, J., concurring).
26. Zivotofsky v. Sec'y of State (Zivotofsky V), 610 F.3d 84, 84 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 563
U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (May 2, 2011) (No. 10-699).
27. Id. at 84-89 (statement of Edwards, J.).
28. Id. at 84.
29. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J.
597 (1976).
30. Id. at 601.
31. See id.
32. See 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). "Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
91
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settled that the President's power to "receive Ambassadors and
other public Ministers"33 confers upon the President the exclusive
power to extend or withdraw political recognition of a foreign
sovereign.34 The D.C. Circuit concluded that this power was "a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department."35 Of course, that required the
court of appeals to formulate the issue as "whether the State
Department can lawfully refuse to record [1.B.Z.'s] place of birth
as Israel in the face of a statute that directs it to do so," not
whether the statute is constitutionally valid.36 But are the two
questions distinctly different queries?
To determine whether the text of the Constitution
demonstrably commits resolution of the issue to a political
branch of government, the Court must first interpret the relevant
constitutional text.37 There can be little doubt that Article II
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." Id.
33. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 3.
34. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964);
Baker, 369 U.S. at 212 ("[T]he judiciary ordinarily follows the executive as to
which nation has sovereignty over disputed territory."); Williams v. Suffolk Ins.
Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839) ("[C]an there be any doubt, that when the executive
branch of the government, which is charged with our foreign relations, shall in
its correspondence with a foreign nation assume a fact in regard to the
sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclusive on the judicial department?
And in this view it is not material to inquire, nor is it the province of the Court
to determine, whether the executive be right or wrong. It is enough to know,
that in the exercise of his constitutional functions, he has decided the
question."); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 307 (1829) ("In a controversy ...
concerning national boundary, ... [t]he judiciary is not that department of the
government, to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is
confided.").
35. Zivotofsky IV, 571 F.3d 1227, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Baker, 369
U.S. at 217), reh'g denied, 610 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. granted
sub nom. M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (May
2, 2011) (No. 10-699).
36. Zivotofsky IV, 571 F.3d at 1230.
37. See, e.g., id. at 1232 ("We must always begin by interpreting the
constitutional text in question and determining 'whether and to what extent the
92
HeinOnline  -- 6 Charleston L. Rev. 92 2011-2012
commits reception of foreign ambassadors to the exclusive
discretion of the President.38 Prior courts interpreting that
provision-for simplicity, the recognition power-have held that
the recognition power includes the question of acknowledging or
withholding recognition of territory as under the sovereignty of
some foreign power, especially when there is an international
dispute on that point.39 The only remaining interpretational
issue is whether § 214(d)-a statutory command to treat
Jerusalem as part of Israel for purposes of passport issuance-
involves the recognition power. Issuance of a passport is a
government's official declaration of the citizenship of the
passport holder, and the information contained in that document
is an assertion of fact by the issuing government. 40 Thus, a
statement that Israel is the place of birth of a passport holder
born in Jerusalem is a governmental declaration about which
nation has sovereignty of Jerusalem.41 Even if that statement is
only one of policy-either it is American policy to regard
Jerusalem as a de facto part of Israel or it is national policy to
refrain from making any assertion about the status of
Jerusalem-"[o]bjections to the underlying policy as well as
objections to recognition [of foreign governments] are to be
addressed to the political department and not to the courts."42
Zivotofsky claims that the political department has
addressed the issue, by enacting § 214(d), and thus the issue is
justiciable.43 But this argument leaps too many hurdles in one
bound. The entire point of the political question doctrine is to
issue is textually committed."' (quoting Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
228 (1993))).
38. Zivoto/sky IV, 571 F.3d at 1231.
39. See Williams, 38 U.S. at 420 (holding that recognition power includes
the question of sovereignty of the Falkland Islands).
40. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292-93 (1981) (citing Urtetiqui v.
D'Arcy, 34 U.S. 692, 699 (1835)).
41. Cf. Haig, 453 U.S. at 292-93 (inferring that the government's retention
of authority on the issuance of a passport and the decision where a passport
holder is from, in effect asserts which nation has sovereignty of the passport
holder).
42. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
43. Zivotofsky V, 610 F.3d 84, 85-86 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert.
granted sub nom. M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 563 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct.
2897 (May 2, 2011) (No. 10-699).
93
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preserve the Constitution's separation of federal powers. 44 The
"textually demonstrable commitment" strand of the doctrine
mandates that the courts defer to that political organ of
government to which the Constitution has assigned the power
and responsibility to decide the matter.45 Thus, in Nixon v.
United States, the Court interpreted the constitutional text in
question ("[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments"46) to confer an exclusive and non-justiciable
power upon the Senate to decide upon the manner of
impeachment trials.47 Nixon requires the Court in M.B.Z. first to
interpret the constitutional provision-the recognition power. 48
Because the recognition power has been previously determined to
be an exclusive and discretionary power of the President to
formulate policy concerning recognition of foreign governments
and the scope of their sovereignty over disputed territory, the
courts have no power to entertain claims to the contrary. 49 By
enacting a statute, Congress may attempt to dictate national
44. See, e.g., id. at 85 (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549
(1969) ("Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion
interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given
the document by another branch.")).
45. See Zivoto/sky V, 610 F.3d at 88 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211 (1962) ("Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate
exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of this Court as
ultimate interpreter of the constitution.")).
46. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
47. 506 U.S. 224, 243 (1993). Similarly, the Court in Powell first
interpreted the provision of Article I, Section 5, empowering each House of
Congress to "be the judge of the . . . [q]ualifications of its own members," to
determine the scope of the textual commitment to each House. The Court relied
upon the qualifications clause of Article I, Section 2, which specifies the
minimum qualifications for members of the House-age, citizenship, and
residence-as limiting the scope of the non-justiciable power conferred on each
House to judge the qualifications of its members. Powell, 395 U.S. at 489, 521.
48. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 224-26.
49. Zivoto/sky III, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Baker, 369
U.S. at 212 ("[R]ecognition of foreign government so strongly defies judicial
treatment that without executive recognition a foreign stat has been called a
'republic of whose existence we know nothing."')), affd 571 F.3d 1227 (D.C. Cir.
2009), reh'g denied, 610 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. granted sub
nom. M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 563 U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (May 2,
2011) (No. 10-699).
94
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policy but recourse to the courts to enforce the statute is not an
option.5 0
By this reasoning, the issue in M.B.Z. is a non-justiciable
political question, but one must ask whether there is any
substantive difference between a conclusion that § 214(d) is an
unconstitutional invasion of the recognition power and a decision
that the matter is not susceptible to judicial resolution.51 Courts
are permitted to determine the scope of the recognition power,
when a decision involves a recognition power question, because
that is the predicate for a conclusion that any particular dispute
is not justiciable.52 That seems identical to the question
presented when Congress directs the President to use the
recognition power in a specified manner: Did Congress exceed its
constitutional authority?
There is, however, somewhat more elasticity to the political
question doctrine than in decisions on the merits. Consider
§214(b), which forbids appropriated funds to be used to operate
any "diplomatic facility" of the United States in Jerusalem unless
it is "under the supervision of the United States Ambassador to
Israel."53 Suppose that the President wishes to establish a
diplomatic facility in Jerusalem, perhaps to provide visas and
other consular services, under the auspices of the United
Nations. A judicial conclusion that § 214(b) implicates the
recognition power and is thus non-justiciable avoids deciding the
thorny question of whether Congress may use its undeniable
appropriations power to prevent the President from engaging in
a particular form of non-recognition of the status of Jerusalem.
If the issue is deemed justiciable, the courts have no choice but to
decide the vexed question of a clash between Congress's
appropriation power and the President's recognition power.
50. Zivotofsky III, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 102-03.
51. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26a M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v.
Clinton, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (May 2, 2011) (No. 10-699); Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d),
116 Stat. 1350, 1365-66 (2002).
52. See, e.g., Zivoto/sky V, 610 F.3d 84, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert.
granted sub nom. M.B.Z. ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 563 U.S. , 131 S. Ct.
2897 (May 2, 2011) (No. 10-699).
53. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year of 2003 § 214(b).
95
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Invocation of the political question doctrine leaves this issue as a
political struggle between Congress and the President. The
President may find other funds to establish the diplomatic
facility or he may simply ignore the appropriations limit.
Congress may retaliate by embarrassing the President via
hearings or, in extremis, impeachment.
Section 214(c) bars the use of appropriated funds to publish
"any official government document which lists countries and
their capital cities unless the publication identifies Jerusalem as
the capital of Israel."54 This also poses a conflict between the
appropriations power and the recognition power. Congress seeks
to put the President to a hard choice: Ignore the political map of
the world unless he is willing to proclaim Jerusalem as Israel's
capital. Suppose the President ignores the edict. Once again,
refusal to adjudicate a proper case that seeks to enforce § 214(c)
avoids resolution of the intractable conflict between an
exclusively congressional power and an exclusively presidential
power.
In its "textual commitment" form, the political question
doctrine leaves room for ordinary democratic politics to resolve
issues that the Constitution, by design, has left to one or both of
the political branches. At the dawn of American constitutional
law, Chief Justice Marshall observed that "[t]he province of the
court is . . . not to enquire how the executive, or executive
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.
Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court."@5 But the limits of that notion can be seen in
an old case, Jones v. United States.56
The question arose whether United States courts could
exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with murder on
Navassa, a Caribbean island claimed by the United States and a
foreign nation.57 The Court upheld jurisdiction because the
President, with the blessing of Congress, had asserted that the
54. Id. § 214(c).
55. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803).
56. 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890).
57. Id. at 203-04.
96
[Volume 6
HeinOnline  -- 6 Charleston L. Rev. 96 2011-2012
Political Question
United States possessed sovereignty over the island.58 The Court
noted: "Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is
not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of which
by the legislative and executive departments of any government
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens
and subjects of that government."59 In Jones, Congress and the
President were in agreement that the United States possessed
sovereignty over the disputed island,60 but what if Congress and
the President were at odds? Suppose that despite a statute
abjuring any American claim to Navassa, the President asserted
sovereignty and federal prosecutors acted accordingly.
Application of the political question doctrine would leave the
courts with jurisdiction. But if Congress enacted a law expressly
asserting American sovereignty over Navassa and the President
disclaimed sovereignty, application of the political question
doctrine would leave the courts without jurisdiction. That latter
conclusion would effectively render the government powerless to
prosecute crimes committed on the island, and thus would
amount to a decision that the United States lacked sovereignty-
precisely the issue the Court said it could not decide. If the
Court had proceeded to decide the actual case on the merits it
would no doubt have ruled that the recognition power gave the
President exclusive authority to decide the issue.61 Jurisdiction
would then depend on whichever position the President
happened to take,62 but that is precisely what would happen
under the political question doctrine.
A somewhat different problem occurred in Chicago &
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.63
Congress created the Civil Aeronautics Board, vested it with the
responsibility to grant or deny permits for air carriers to provide
service to or from foreign nations (subject to final approval of
those decisions by the President), and provided for judicial review
58. Id. at 223.
59. Id. at 212.
60. Id. at 222-23.
61. Id. at 213.
62. Of course, a criminal prosecution would depend upon the existence of a
valid federal statute covering the act in question. See, e.g., id. at 211.
63. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
97
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of all such orders.64 The President approved the Board's denial of
a permit to Waterman and grant of one to C&S.65 Waterman
sought judicial review.66 The Court noted that it could not
review the Board's action prior to presidential action because this
would be an advisory opinion barred by the "case or controversy"
limit upon the federal judicial power. 67 Nor could it review the
President's approval of the Board's actions:
The President . . . has available intelligence services whose
reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It
would be intolerable that courts . . . should review and perhaps
nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly
held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken
into executive confidences. But even if courts could require full
disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign
policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly
confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the
government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate,
complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and
should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the
people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are
decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither
aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been
held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to
judicial intrusion or inquiry.68
Here is a conflict between Congress and the President.
Congress sought to vest the courts with the power to review
presidential decisions concerning foreign relations;69 the
President (via the Civil Aeronautics Board) resisted such
review.70 By declaring that the controversy was not justiciable
the Court effectively sided with the President. Unlike Jones,
however, the Court could not just as easily have said that the
64. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, §§ 402(a)-(g), 1006(a), 52 Stat.
973, 991-92, 1024 (1938).
65. Chi. & Southern Air Lines, Inc., 333 U.S. at 105.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 112-13.
68. Id. at 111.
69. Id. at 110.
70. Id. at 105.
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President has exclusive control over air transportation routes in
foreign commerce, for Section Eight of Article I plainly gives
Congress power to regulate foreign commerce. 71 It may or may
not be the case that the President has final control over the
award of air routes in foreign commerce, but the Court did not
decide that question. By refusing to decide the issue, it left the
matter for decision by Congress and the President. Congress
could amend the statute to vest the Civil Aeronautics Board with
final authority, or it could award the routes by ordinary
legislation. If award of air routes in foreign commerce is truly a
non-justiciable political question, the validity of those measures
might also be beyond judicial ken. But if the President does have
total control over such matters, these latter measures
would require a decision on the merits that the President's
constitutional authority has been usurped.
These possibilities illustrate the chameleon-like nature of the
political question doctrine: A decision on the merits is
unnecessary if the status quo is an acceptable constitutional
solution, but if it is not acceptable, a decision on the merits may
be necessary. That may explain the enigmatic concurrence of
Justice Souter in Nixon: The Senate's use of a twelve-member
committee to hear evidence in an impeachment trial of a federal
judge was not justiciable because "[tlhis occasion does not
demand an answer," but "different and unusual circumstances"-
such as the Senate acting "in a manner seriously threatening the
integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin-toss"-"might
be so far beyond the scope of [the Senate's] constitutional
authority . . . to merit a judicial response."72 But this
understanding of the political question doctrine treats it as
prudential-a matter of judicial discretion-rather than a
constitutional imperative. Yet the "textually demonstrable
commitment" prong of the doctrine strongly implies that the
Constitution commits judicially unreviewable discretion over
some issues to either the President or Congress.
So, in the end, Professor Henkin may have it about right.
The political question doctrine is a mirage. It looks like a
71. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
72. Nixon v. United States. 506 U.S. 224. 253-54 (1993).
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constitutional rule, mandating courts to eschew decision of
matters that the Constitution has committed to a political branch
for decision, but it dissolves on closer inspection, leaving only the
hardpan of a decision on the merits of the claim.
III. MAY CONGRESS DIRECT THE PRESIDENT TO
RECOGNIZE JERUSALEM AS PART OF ISRAEL?
This question can be reduced to two syllogisms:
I. Major Premise: The recognition power is possessed
exclusively by the President. 73
Minor Premise: Congress is not the President.
Conclusion: Congress does not possess the recognition power.
II. Major Premise: The recognition power includes the power to
remain neutral as to the political status of territory claimed by
two or more sovereigns. 74
Minor Premise: Jerusalem is claimed by Israel, Jordan, and as
a "corpus separatum"-an international city under the control
of the United Nations and independent of any nation state.
Conclusion: The recognition power includes the political status
of Jerusalem.
Therefore, Congress may not direct the President to
recognize Jerusalem as part of Israel. If this conclusion is
incorrect it must be due to a defect in either of the syllogisms.
Let us attend to the premises.
Justice Robert Jackson set forth in his concurring opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer a framework for
analyzing the validity of unilateral exercise of executive power, a
structure that contains "as much combination of analysis and
common sense as there is in this area."75 Justice Jackson divided
the instances of presidential power into three categories: a
maximum power zone, a minimum power zone, and a twilight
zone. "When the President acts pursuant to an express or
73. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbationo, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964).
74. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962).
75. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (citing Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right
plus all that Congress can delegate."76 By contrast:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in
such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon
the subject . . . .77
The twilight zone is up for grabs:
When the President acts in absence of either a
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely
upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore,
congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite,
measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this
area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather
than on abstract theories of law. 78
Section 214(d) falls into the minimum power zone. Congress
has directed the President to list Israel as the birthplace of
American citizens born in Jerusalem.79 If the President has the
power to ignore this directive it is because the issue of the status
of Jerusalem, as indicated in an official government-issued
document, is assigned by the Constitution exclusively to the
President and the Congress is barred from acting upon the
subject.80 Ample precedent holds that this is indeed so.8'
76. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (majority opinion).
77. Id. at 637-38.
78. Id. at 637.
79. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No.
107-228, § 214(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002).
80. President George W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1658, 1659 (Sept. 30,
2002).
81. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) ("[Tlhe judiciary
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To the extent that the political question doctrine is a decision
on the merits by another name, the political question cases
provide the answer.
What government is to be regarded here as representative of a
foreign sovereign state is a political rather than a judicial
question, and is to be determined by the political department
of the government. That authority is not limited to a
determination of the government to be recognized. It includes
the power to determine the policy which is to govern the
question of recognition . .82
Moreover, there is no "doubt, that when the executive branch
of the government, which is charged with our foreign relations,
shall in its correspondence with a foreign nation assume a fact in
regard to the sovereignty of any island or country, it is conclusive
on the judicial department."83
Zivotofsky argues that the political question doctrine is not
applicable because Congress is a political branch and it has
decided the issue by enactment of § 214(d).84 But this simply
raises the question of whether Congress has any authority to
enact the law (assuming that the issue is justiciable and that the
political question issue is analytically distinct from the issue of
congressional power). The practical problems attendant to
permitting Congress any role in directing the President to treat
disputed territory as under the sovereignty of one of the
ordinarily follows the executive as to which nation has sovereignty over
disputed territory . . . ." (citations omitted)); see also Knox v. Palestine
Liberation Org., 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("[B]ecause comity is
often a function of recognition, matters concerning who is recognized as the
sovereign or government of a particular territory, and whether and to what
extent comity is accorded to its acts and officials, are political questions
uniquely within the domain and prerogatives of the executive branch.").
82. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
83. See Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839).
84. Zivotofsky also argues that the effect of President Bush's signing
statement, in which he declared § 214(d) to be unconstitutional, amounts to
partial veto of the bill that is impermissible under the reasoning of Clinton v.
City of New York. 524 U.S. 417 (1998); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at
16, Clinton, 524 U.S. at 417 (No. 10-699), available at http://sblog.s3.
amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/MBZ-v.-Clinton-No.-10-699-Cert-
Petition.pdf.
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disputants overwhelmingly point to a conclusion that this is an
exclusively executive power. Foreign relations require that a
nation speak with a single voice. Multiple and contradictory
declarations of American foreign policy cause other nations to
doubt that they can rely on anything that the President or
Congress may say. Foreign relations are conducted, in practice
and on a daily basis, by executive branch officials. If Congress
can countermand the policies that result from these often secret
diplomatic initiatives, foreign policy will be made in an
informational deficit, if not an outright vacuum. To permit
Congress to tell the President how the nation must treat
disputed territory is to require the President to lobby Congress
continually to preserve the President's policies. That is a
cumbersome, inefficient, and awkward method of conducting
foreign relations. Moreover, it poses great risks to the nation as
a whole to permit Congress to overrule a delicate diplomatic
truce that the President deems appropriate. If Congress could
tell the President that passports issued to American citizens born
in Taipei must list the country of birth as "Taiwan," or the
"Republic of China," the repercussions with the People's Republic
of China would be enormous. If ever there were an occasion for
employing prudential reasoning to interpret the Constitution,
this must be it.
The implications of deciding the validity of § 214(d) on the
merits are considerable. Section 214(d) may be easily determined
to be ultra vires, but what about sections 214(b) and (c), each of
which condition the expenditure of appropriated funds on
presidential conformity to Congress's notion of the proper status
of Jerusalem? Of course Congress has control of the purse, but
its exercise of that power is not unlimited.85 For example,
Congress may not condition federal spending on state compliance
with an otherwise unconstitutional mandate,86 or by coupling
that spending with a condition wholly unrelated to any federal
interest,87 or to coerce states to abandon their independent
85. E.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
86. E.g., id. at 208, 210.
87. E.g., id. at 207; Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978).
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governance. 88 Congress may decide how much money it is willing
to spend to support the State Department and other organs of
American foreign policy, but surely it cannot condition the use of
that money on presidential obedience to a congressional dictate of
which foreign government has sovereignty over the island of
Taiwan, the Falkland Islands, or Jerusalem. If it is untenable to
permit Congress to require the President to treat Avignon as the
capital of France, it must be equally untenable to permit
Congress to condition the expenditure of any funds for American
diplomatic facilities in France upon the President's acquiescence
in relocating the American embassy to Avignon.
These issues are not, of course, before the Court in M.B.Z.,
but a decision on the merits of § 214(d) will inevitably require the
Court to decide, case by case, the limits of congressional power to
use the federal treasury to compel presidential acquiescence to a
congressionally driven foreign policy. Consider the current
dispute among China, Vietnam, and the Philippines concerning
sovereignty in the South China Sea. China claims sovereign
control of the entire sea.89 Vietnam and the Philippines make
more modest claims to their territorial waters in the South China
Sea, and Vietnam claims sovereignty over the Spratly Islands,
which are also claimed by China.90 Suppose that Congress were
to enact an omnibus appropriations measure that bars any
expenditures for any American governmental presence in the
Philippines or Vietnam unless the President has declared that
China has sovereignty over the South China Sea and the Spratly
Islands. Suppose the President declares that the United States
regards the South China Sea as international waters, and
proceeds to spend funds in disregard of the statute. Once again,
the political question doctrine most likely permits the Court to
defer to the President without deciding whether Congress has
exceeded its appropriation power.
88. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
89. John Pomfret, Beijing Claims 'Indisputable Sovereignty' Over South
China Sea, WASH. PosT, July 31, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/30/AR2010073005664.html.
90. Country Analysis Briefs: South China Sea, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://
www.eia.gov/emeulcabs/SouthChina-Sealpdf.pdf (last updated Mar. 2008).
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However analytically correct Professor Henkin may have
been about the political question doctrine, it turns out that there
is practical wisdom in invoking the doctrine. Treating vexed
issues of these types as non-justiciable forces Congress and the
President to resolve their differences through appeals to the
people. Perhaps De Tocqueville had it half right: All subjects in
America become a matter of judicial debate,91 but not every
subject will be resolved by the judiciary.
91. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 284.
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